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Centre de recherches mathdmatiques, Universitd e Montrdal, Montrdal, Canada 
Dictionary definitions are logical combinations of basic markers. Definitions 
can be reduced to disjunctions of meanings, which are conjunctions of markers. 
The  set of words which can take on a meaning is its lexical representation set, 
and under  natural conditions such sets are partially ordered by inclusion in 
the same way as the meanings are ordered by implication. To  each set of lexical 
representation sets, however, there may exist several, nontrivially different, 
minimal  dictionaries. When a probabil ity measure is imposed on a dictionary, 
certain conditional probabilities can be extended to measures on algebras 
generated by lexical representation sets but  not those generated by correspond- 
ing sets of markers. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of a dictionary, or inventory of the relationships between words 
and meanings in a language, is important o most linguistic theories. This 
paper compares two empirically-motivated approaches to the formalization 
of this notion. The first assumes the existence of a set of primitive entities 
called markers uch that every meaning can be represented by some Boolean 
combination of markers. See, for example, Chomsky (1965, Chap. 2, Section 3; 
Chap. 4, Section 2), Katz (1966), Lehrer (1970). The second is based on the 
hierarchical arrangement of generic and specific terms in taxonomies (e.g., 
Kay 1969). 
To compare these approaches, they must be formalized so that they deal 
with the same types of data. This will require a mathematical simplification 
and idealization of theories of dictionaries based on markers on the one hand, 
and a generalization from taxonomies to a wider class of partial orders on 
the other. Then these two approaches lead to classes of dictionaries which 
are comparable in a natural way. After exploring this comparison with the 
help of the notion of economy of marking, we will be able to point out some 
previously unnoticed properties of the class of marker-based inventories which 
do not seem to be useful, or desirable, in the context of semantics. 
In the final section of this paper, we use the algebraic structures of 
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dictionaries as the bases for probabil ity measures. This suggests a foundation 
for a statistical theory of performance derived from competence models of 
dictionaries, and a link between the voluminous empirical results on the 
"surface" phenomena of word frequency, statistical stylistics, etc. (see 
Dolezel and Bailey 1969), and modern "structural" linguistics. 
2. DEFINITIONS 
In this section and the next we apply the terminology and format of Boolean 
function theory as developed by Quine (and summarized by Birkhoff and 
Bartee, 1970) to dictionary structure. 
Let W and M be finite sets. A dictionary D consists of 
(i) for each w ~ W, a single implication w ~ d, where d is a logical 
formula involving elements m ~ M,  using only ^ (conjunction) and v 
(disjunction); and 
(ii) a subset S o of the fundamental formulae (elements of M and 
conjunctions of them), which excludes formulae representing semantic self- 
contradiction, but includes allprime implicants of d in (i). p is a prime implicant 
of d if p ~ d but no q ~ d, where q is p minus any of its markers (Quine, 
1959; Birkhoff and Bartee, 1970, p. 180). 
W is the set of words, M the set of markers, and the implications w => d 
are called dictionary entries, where d is the definition of w. S o is the redundancy 
structure of the dictionary, and the elements of S o are meanings. 
The uniqueness condition in (i) is not a restriction if it is assumed that the 
two entries w ~ d 1 and w ~ d~ would together be equivalent to w ~ d 1 v d 2 . 
The exclusion of ~,o (negation) from definitions is made so as to avoid 
assuming that every marker has a negative, or that semantic features must be 
binary rather than multivalued. In our formulation, two (unary) markers may 
act as negations of each other, i.e., they may be labelled m+ and m-, and all 
meanings containing m + ^  m- excluded from S O . In the same way, 
m 1 , m 2 ,..., m~ may be considered mutually exclusive values of a multivalued 
semantic feature, and meanings containing m, ^  mj will be excluded from S o 
fo r i  =/=j. 
A natural restriction on D, complementary to the exclusion of self- 
contradictions from S O , is the assumption that no definition d is tautologous. 
For example, if every meaning in S o contains at least one of m 1 , m 2 ,..., ink, 
then for no definition d is 
d <~> m I v m 2 v ""  v mT~ . 
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It may be remarked about these restrictions and conventions that in order 
to concentrate on the mathematical properties of dictionaries with markers, 
we have in effect relegated questions which are linguistically problematic 
or controversial to being questions about the structure of S o only. 
3. CANONICAL FORM FOR DICTIONARIES 
Since no negations are present in a dictionary definition, it may be reduced 
to a unique simplest normal form. This result, due to Quine (1952, p. 531), 
may be rephrased as: 
THEOREM 1. I f  no reference may be made to S O , then each dictionary may 
be reduced to (is logically equivalent to) a unique dictionary in canonical form, 
i.e., where the entries are in simplest normal form 
w ~Pl  vp~ v " "  vp~, (1) 
such that each clause Pi is a meaning (conjunction of markers): 
P i  ~--- ml  i A m2 i A "'" A m~ i. 
Moreover, the new canonical dictionary has the same redundancy structure S O as 
the original dictionary. 
Proof. Let ml, m 2 ,..., m r be the markers appearing in the formula d. 
From all the possible fundamental formulae involving only these markers, let 
ql, q2 ,..., ql~ be those which imply d, and relabel as P l ,  P~ ,..., P~ just those q 
which do not imply any other q. Then 
dc>plvp2v ' "vp j  
and the equivalence breaks down if any of the p's are missing from the 
right side or if there are any other clauses present which do not contain a p. 
Hence this is the simplest normal form equivalent to d. 
Since the prime implicants of a definition must be contained in So, and 
since these are also the prime implicants of the normal form (in fact, the p), 
the last statement in the theorem follows. 
The redundancy structure of a dictionary may be used to further simplify 
definitions in certain cases, but there are then competing criteria of 
simplicity--fewest clauses versus fewest markers or fewest total number of 
symbols (Birkhoff and Bartee, 1970, p. 179). Even in the case where every 
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marker has a negative and S o contains all fundamental formulae xcept self- 
contradictions, uniqueness of the simplest normal form does not necessarily 
hold--see, for example, Quine (1955, p. 630). 
4. SEMANTIC FIELD AND LEXICAL REPRESENTATION SETS 
The prime implicants of the definition of a word are only the most general 
meanings that word can take on. In fact, a word may be used, without logical 
inconsistency, for any meaning in S o which implies at least one of its prime 
implicants. This motivates the definition of the semantic field of a word; if 
w ~ pl  v p2 v "" v ps , 
S(w) = {q l q 6 So andq~pi fo rsomei~<j} .  (2) 
The semantic field of a word includes each clause of the canonical dictionary 
definition plus all more specific (with additional markers) meanings. 
The lexical representation set of a meaning p includes all words which 
include that meaning in their semantic fields. Then we define, for p E So,  
L (p)  = {w ~ W Ip c S(w)}. 
As is usual in formal semantic theories, the concepts of semantic field and 
lexical representation set have utility only in contexts where the coining of 
metaphors and other unusual usages of lexical items are restricted, or where 
threshold conditions are used in a probabilistic theory of semantics--see 
Sechser (1967). 
5. ECONOMY OF MARKING 
I f  there are very many words in a dictionary and few markers, the semantic 
fields of different words may coincide. This phenomenon, synonymy, is 
acceptable in a concise but complete dictionary or in the preliminary version 
of a dictionary. On the other hand, if there are too many markers in a 
dictionary, either (a) the set W does not contain enough words to distinguish 
between meanings, or else (b) there is an excessive, or inefficient, assignment 
of markers. Our notation will be in terms of (b). In particular, if for some 
m ~_/'Vl, n ~ M 
¢ ~ L(m) = L(n), 
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the dictionary is strongly redundant. Weakening this somewhat, if for some 
m ~ M, and some meaning p, 
~-~(p ~ m) but ~ 4 = L(m)C_L(p), 
then the dictionary is weakly redundant. A still subtler type of "pathology" 
occurs when, for some meaningsp and q, 
~-~(p ~ q) but 9~ 4= L(q) C_L(p). 
When this does not occur, we say tile dictionary is partially ordered. In what 
follows, we study the class of partially ordered dictionaries. 
THEOREM 2. Each partially ordered dictionary defines a one-to-one map 
between the lexically represented meanings in S O and A = {L(p)}~So -- 4. 
Proof. It need only be proved that the mapp --~L(p) is invertible. That is, 
i fp va qandL(p)  :#(~, thenL(p) ~:L(q). Butp 4= q ~ ~(p  ~ q) v ~(q  ~p)  
[L(q) ~L(p)]  v [L(p)~L(q)],  
by the partial order property. Then 
L(p) 4= L(q). 
THEOREM 3. Each set A, whose elements are nonvoid subsets of W, defines 
at least one minimal partially ordered dictionary such that 
A = {L(p)}~So. 
Proof. Consider the partial order of A by inclusion, (A, C). By Theorem 2, 
this must be isomorphic to the partial order by implication (S o , ~)  of any 
dictionary, where L(p) ~ A is the lexical representation set of p ~ S o . It  
suffices to construct one such (S o , ~) ,  for then there must exist a minimal 
such ordering, for any reasonable criterion of minimality, e.g., having the 
smallest marker set M. 
To each smallest (i.e., extreme left) set Lx ~ A, assign a marker m i , and 
assign it as well to each set in A which includes (is on the right o f )L , .  This 
produces a preliminary marking of all sets. I f  no two sets have the same 
marking, the assignment is finished. I f  some pair of sets L i , L~ not related by 
the partial order, have the same marking, assign markers m i and mj, respec- 
tively, to them (and to sets on the right of them). Do this to the Ieftmost 
remaining pairs until there are none left. (If there is a triplet of sets identically 
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marked, assign three new markers, etc.) If a pair of sets L~ C L~ have the same 
marking, it suffices to put a new marker on L; and sets on its right. 
The resulting marking is such that no two sets are marked the same and if 
p and q are the markings on sets L~ and Lq, p ~ q if and only if L~ is to the 
right ofLq, i.e., if and only ifLq CL~.  
Now it is possible to assign dictionary definitions to w ~ W. Let w ~L~ ~ A, 
such that p is the marking on L~. Then the disjunction of all such p is the 
dictionary definition of w. (This must then be reduced to canonical form.) 
S(w) will also consist of just these meanings. L(p) consists of all w such that 
p ~ S(w) and hence L(p) = L~ which completes the theorem. 
There are other, somewhat easier, constructions of marking systems, such 
as the assignment to each set in A of all the words in that set. The construction 
in Theorem 3, however, is more interesting in that if often produces a 
minimal marking. 
6. NONUNIQUENESS OF MARKING SYSTEMS 
It is not true that the minimal marking in Theorem 3 is always unique. 
Figure 1 depicts cases where (A, C) is consistent with two minimal marking 
systems, where the difference is not merely a permutation of marker labels. 
In an earlier study (Sankoff, 1969) it was suggested that for certain aspects 
of semantic structure it suffices to consider meanings in terms of their lexical 
representation sets. Furthermore, in the practical construction of dictionaries 
or parts of dictionaries, as in ethnosemantics (Tyler, 1969), it is frequently the 
case that the data consists of relationships of a taxonomic or set-theoretic 
nature; e.g., a set of words can all be considered synonyms in a certain context, 
some words can take on specific and generic meanings while others can take 
on only specific connotations, etc. Dictionaries with markers are often 
considered convenient and natural ways of summarizing taxonomic data. 
But as was pointed out by Burling (1969) and Hymes (1969), there is no 
unique way, in general, of constructing marker systems even in the case of 
tree-like taxonomies. What about the existence of marker systems which 
are most natural or economical in some sense ? This has been doubted, on 
psycholinguistic grounds, by Macnamara (1971), and the counterexamples to 
uniqueness in Fig. 1 prove the following result. 
THEOREM 4. In general, taxonomic data (i.e., lexical representation sets for 




ab abce a 




- ~abcdxz  
a aby 
b ~  abcdxy 
e ~  ex 
ez 
FIG. 1. Alternate minimal markings for dictionary with five lexical representation 
sets (top) and for one with thirteen sets (bottom). Nodes represent sets, directed line 
paths represent inclusion relations and a, b,..., x, y,... are markers. 
This theorem implies that in constructing dictionaries with markers on the 
basis of taxonomic data, one runs the risk of implicitly assuming certain 
details of semantic structure which have no counterpart in the data. 
7. PROBABILITY AND DICTIONARIES 
The imposition of probabilities on sets of words and meanings has been 
studied by Sechser (1967), Sankoff (1969), and Lehrer (1970). In particular, 
Lehrer demonstrated the necessity of having probability weights on certain 
markers in definitions. 
On type of event which should be measurable in any probability space 
associated with a dictionary, occurs when a word w takes on a meaning p in 
its semantic field as defined in (2). This must be the single most specific 
meaning w is construed as having in the particular context being considered. 
Given a dictionary D, let 2 W and 2 s0 stand for the sets of all subsets of W 
and S o , respectively. Without ambiguity, we will write {w} as w. 
Let P(',  ") be a bivariate real function on 2 W × 2 so with values in [0, 1], 
satisfying 
P(w, p) > 0 .~ p ~ S(w), (3) 
P (A ,B)  -- ~ ~ P(w,p) (4) 
w~A 2o~B 
P(W, So) ---- 1. (5) 
DICTIONARIES AND PROBABILITIES 111 
Then P(-, ") is clearly a probability measure on the algebra of subsets of 
W × So, where P(w, p) may be interpreted as the probability of the event 
that w is used and takes on meaning p. Condition (3) ensures that the 
probability that a word takes on a meaning outside its semantic field is zero. 
For p ~ q ~ So, define P~(q) as the probability that if the meaning p is 
expressed, the word that expresses it is inL(q). Then 
P(L(q), p) 
G(q) -  P(L(p),p) " 
P~(-) can be considered as a set function defined either on certain subsets of 
the markers in p, or on elements of A~, the set of lexical representation sets 
of meanings implied by p. In either case, can the domain of definition of 
P~(.) be extended in a natural way to an algebra on which P~(-) is a probability 
measure ? The answer is provided by the following. 
THEOREM 5. Let H~ be the set of subsets of markers corresponding to meanings 
implied by p. ZI~ is the set of lexical representation sets of the same meanings. 
Then P~(') has a natural extension to a probability measure on tile algebra 
generated by A~ , but not, in general, to the algebra generated by 1-1~ . 
Proof. Since P~(-) takes on values in [0, 1] and P,(p) = 1, it remains 
only to prove, or give counterexamples to, the additivity property required of 
measures. 
In the case of the algebra generated by A~, this is a subalgebra of 2 w and 
hence of 2 W × 2 s0 and P~,(.) is a conditional probability measure, given that 
the meaning p is used. Such measures, of course, are additive. 
In the case of the algebra generated by H~,  consider two meanings q, 
and q2, both implied by p, but having no markers in common, and disjoint 
lexical representation sets. I f  the meaning ql ^ q2 is in So, its lexical 
representation set contains those of ql and q2 but possibly other words as 
well, so that in such a case 
P~,(ql) 47 P~,(q~) < P~(ql ^  q2). 
The foregoing result indicates that sets of lexical representation sets are 
more natural bases for a probabilistic theory of semantics than dictionaries 
with markers. It is worth noting, however, that P~(') respects the partial 
order by implication of S o . 
Two types of marginal probabilities of P( ' ,  -) have special status in the 
literature. P(-, So) is the probability measure underlying word-frequency 
distributions (e.g., Juilland and Chang-Rodriguez, 1965, and P(W, ") is 
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at least conceptually related to the semantic frequency lists of Eaton (1940). 
The notion that a word takes on different meanings in its semantic field 
with fixed probabilities i ll the simplest heory which accounts for observable 
usage frequencies for different synonyms, generic versus specific terms, 
polysemous (multiple meanings) words versus unambiguous ones, etc. Insofar 
as this theory is reasonable, there must exist a (unique) probability measure 
P(-, ") satisfying (3), (4), and (5) such that in long enough texts the frequencies 
of lexical-semantic phenomena should approximate the expected value 
predicted by P(', '). 
Recently, there has been considerable progress in extending structural 
linguistic theory through the incorporation of probabilistic onsiderations. 
See, for example, Horning (1969) on grammatical inference, Labov (1969) on 
phonology and syntax, and Peizer and Olmsted (1969) on acquisition. The 
imposition of probability measures on dictionaries continues this development. 
For instance, it provides a possible basis for treating lexical choice as being 
governed by variable rules. 
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